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Abstract. A new approach for the description of phenomena of social aggregation
is suggested. On the basis of psychological concepts (as for instance social norms and
cultural coordinates), we deduce a general mechanism for the social aggregation in
which different clusters of individuals can merge according to the cooperation among
the agents. In their turn, the agents can cooperate or defect according to the clusters
distribution inside the system. The fitness of an individual increases with the size of
its cluster, but decreases with the work the individual had to do in order to join it. In
order to test the reliability of such new approach, we introduce a couple of simple toy
models with the features illustrated above. We see, from this preliminary study, how
the cooperation is the most convenient strategy only in presence of very large clusters,
while on the other hand it is not necessary to have one hundred percent of cooperators
for reaching a totally ordered configuration with only one megacluster filling the whole
system.
PACS: 89.65.-s, 02.50.Le, 89.20.-a, 89.75.-k
1. Introduction
The study of the evolution of social systems is a topic nowadays attracting the interest of
researchers from different domains such as physics, psychology, mathematics. In fact, an
interdisciplinary approach provides a more powerful way to understand and model such
complex systems [1]. One important issue within this field is the understanding of the
phenomena of social aggregation, as for instance urbanization, cultural clusterization,
imitative processes in econophysics.
The classical approach of sociophysics is by means of Statistical Mechanics: the
system under analysis is considered in a thermodynamical way, i.e. it is seen as
composed by a great number of identical elementary units and, starting from the
rules governing the microscopical dynamics of individuals, the general behaviour at
macroscopical level is achieved. Consequently, this methodology is very useful in
those systems whose peculiarity is produced by statistical laws rather than by specific
microscopic details [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
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On the other hand, a different approach is also possible, by means of the analysis
of cooperative behaviours, in particular the study of the emergence of cooperation in
systems of generic agents [8, 9, 10], in financial markets [11] or in academic networks [12].
The main theoretical scaffolding to face such issues is borrowed from game theory, largely
used in econophysics, which focuses on the evolution of the strategies that agents use
during their interactions [13, 14].
Social norms, beliefs, attitudes and opinions are also concepts which have attracted
the interest of researchers from a great number of different fields [15, 16, 17, 18].
Certainly, it is quite hard to define explicitly those objects, but reaching a reliable
representation of them is a required step in order to implement models for social
dynamics. Psychology and sociology are useful tools to provide definitions for concepts
like previous ones, but what we need here is just an operational definition in order to
make our models useful.
On the one hand, sharing the same beliefs, attitudes, opinions and in general social
norms, means to use the same “cultural coordinates” to communicate, enhancing the
process of “social meaning negotiation” [19], defined as the interaction of two individuals
who do not share the same lexicon or meanings, and increasing the probability to
converge to the same ”social cluster”. On the other hand, social fragmentation can
be viewed also as the result of this same process [19]. Moreover, social norms are
objects intrinsically linked together and there is a natural resistance to change cultural
coordinates because it is possible to see them as the product of well-established neural
circuits and because frequently a change would cause a cascade effect on the others.
Thus, importing a psychological representation of cultural coordinates (CC) means at
least to take into consideration three main characteristics:
• CC are hard to change.
• People who have the same CC belong to the same cultural cluster.
• The degree of cultural separation among agents, that is how much their social norms
are different, can be defined as a sort of ”distance” in the abstract space of the CC.
The last crucial ingredient we have to consider here is the role of the environment
on the negotiation strategies. Indeed, from a sociological point of view, it is well-known
that belonging to a big cultural cluster (i.e. sharing the same CC with a great amount of
people) increases the individual fitness [20, 21]. Consequently the macroscopic features
of a population influence the probability to change its own CC to increase the size of
the group.
Finally, the main role of social sciences in this challenge is to link in an ecological
way the microscopic dynamics (i.e. the evolution strategy of individual) with the
macroscopic phenomenology (i.e. the state of the whole system).
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2. Social aggregation and game theory
The purpose of this paper is to study the phenomena of social aggregation by unifying the
thermodynamical approach with the game-theoretical one, and using the psychological
concepts depicted in the Introduction. More precisely, we want to write down models
whose microscopical dynamics is defined starting from the payoff matrix of each agent.
In other words, the interaction between two individuals is determined (also) by their
payoff matrix, and in their turn the payoff matrices of the individuals evolve according
with the dynamics. The details of the dynamics, i.e. the payoff matrix, will be
determined on the basis of psycho-sociological considerations. We stress that our aim
is just to suggest a new methodology, therefore the models introduced here have the
minimum amount of refinement required for such a purpose.
Let us consider a system of N agents where every agent belongs to a cluster. Each
cluster represents a group of individuals who share the same cultural coordinates. From
a psychological point of view we start considering two main assumptions. First, we
assume that an agent tends to maintain his CC. At the same time every agent has an
advantage to belong to a group as big as possible. On the basis of such considerations we
can state that the fitness of an individual increases with the number of other individuals
sharing its same social norms, i.e. with the size of its cluster. On the other hand, the
fitness decreases according to an “economic criterion”, that is according to the work the
individual accomplished in order to merge with its actual group. In practice, when a
player i meets an opponent j from a stranger cluster, its payoff matrix is
Aˆ = {Aκλ} =
(
w1(mj)−
w2(dij )
2
w1(mj −mi + 1)− w2(dij)
w1(1) 0
)
(1)
where the indices κ, λ can indicate C, “cooperation” (availability to join the
opponent’s group), D, “defection” (that is “no cooperation”), while mi is the population
of the cluster of the player i, mj the population of the opponent’s cluster, and dij is the
distance (in the CC space) between the two clusters. Finally, the function w1(m) is the
fitness contribution of m individuals, and w2(d) is the work (i.e. the loss of fitness) an
agent has to bear to cover a distance equal to d.
The meaning of Eq. (1) is then the following: when two cooperators meet, they
put in common their CC, and this is equivalent to the merging of their groups into one.
Moreover, we assume that they “meet in the middle”, so that the work spent is half of
the one due to the original distance between them. If the opponent does not cooperate,
the first player has to cover the entire distance dij to gain the CC of the opponent’s
cluster, and he will lose contact with its original group. On the contrary, if the first
player does not cooperate (but the opponent does) it will not spend anything but gain to
its group only the presence of the second player. Finally, if nobody cooperates, nothing
will happen. Of course, it is meant that only players from different clusters can meet,
or equivalently, that when two players from the same group meet, nothing happens.
It must be noticed that the property of the clusters to merge when two cooperators
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meet is a strong assumption. Anyway, there are many situations in which this
assumption is quite realistic. For example, let us consider the spreading of technological
or cultural advances through different populations: when an individual meets from a
stranger group a new technique useful to face successfully some not yet resolved problem,
presumably he will import that into his original social cluster. If the new technique
improves appreciably the fitness of the population, then it will soon become a common
knowledge of all the members, and under this aspect the two clusters have merged
together. Similar processes can happen for other cultural instances, as for example
languages, religions, traditions. Finally, we stress the fact that the goal of this paper is
just to present a couple of simple toy models in order to show how this new approach
should work. Thus, the models we are going to present in the following sections, both
developed starting from Eq. (1), are very simple and deserve to be improved in the
future.
At last, for simplicity it is reasonable to assume the fitness functions w1(m) and
w2(d) as proportional to the population and to the distance, respectively. Moreover, to
make easier calculations, we set equal to 1 the proportionality constants (⇒ wi(x) = x),
so that the payoff matrix gets the general form
Aˆ =
(
mj −
dij
2
mj −mi + 1− dij
1 0
)
(2)
3. Static Homogeneous Model
As a first step our study, we analyze an oversimplified static model, which we call
“static homogeneous model” (SHM): we assume that the system is always perfectly
homogeneous, so that all the players obey to the same payoff matrix. More precisely,
we consider a system made up by a great number of identical clusters, each one of the
same size m and at the same distance from each other: dij = 2x(1 − δij). Moreover,
we consider such distance 2x big enough to consider the fitness contribution of one
individual negligible with respect to the work needed to cover it: 2x ≫ 1 (anyway, as
it is easy to verify, this approximation does not change appreciably the physics of the
model). So, the payoff matrix Aˆ of Eq. (2) becomes
AˆH =
(
1 + ε −2x
1 0
)
(3)
where ε = m− x− 1 (this will turn out to be the crucial parameter of the SHM).
Of course it is always x > 0. Now, we want just to understand which is the rational
strategy the agents should adopt when meeting foreigners (interactions between players
of the same clusters are not taken into account), in the given configuration, neglecting
any possible time evolution.
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Said p(t) the density of cooperators, its behaviour is given by replicator equation [22,
23]
p˙
p
= fC − 〈AˆH〉 (4)
where fC is the averaged payoff of a cooperator and 〈AˆH〉 the averaged payoff of a
generic player. We have to stress the fact that we consider this system as frozen, and
the time evolution given by the previous equation must be seen just as a mathematical
trick in order to discover the Nash equilibria of the matrix (3). Explicitly, the replicator
equation becomes
dp
dt
= (2x+ ε) · p(1− p)(p− ω) (5)
with
ω =
2x
2x+ ε
(6)
The Nash equilibria of Eq. (5) are in general the roots of the polynomial at right
side: 

pE1 = 0 (no cooperators)
pE2 = 1 (all cooperators)
pE3 = ω (mixed equilibrium)
(7)
In order to understand the phenomenology, it is important to find also the stability
of the equilibria given in Eq. (7). The explicit evaluation of the stability is left in
Appendix, here we just give the results obtained.
CASE ε < 0 - The payoff matrix is here a Prisoner Dilemma’s one. This condition
is equivalent to m < x + 1: the distance among clusters is high enough that the work
needed to merge with another group is always greater than the maximum gain possible
in case of cooperation. Thus, in this case the Nash equilibrium pE1 = 0 is the only one
which is stable: pE2 = 1 is unstable and p
E
3 is not physical, since ω > 1.
CASE ε > 0 - Now we have a Stag Hunt payoff matrix. In this case all the three
equilibria given in Eq. (7) are physical. More precisely, pure equilibria pE1 and p
E
2 are
stable, while the mixed equilibrium pE3 is unstable. Because now it ism > x+1, the gain
in fitness in case of mutual cooperation is bigger than the loss due to the distance, so
that the stable equilibrium pE2 is perfectly understandable. The fact that the equilibrium
pE1 is stable also in this case could be a little bit surprising, but a deeper analysis of the
situation gives back a more intuitive picture: the basin of attraction of equilibrium pE2
increases form (and then ε) increasing, while at the same time the basin of pE1 decreases,
disappearing in the limit ε→ +∞. In this sense, we could state that for great values of
ε the equilibrium pE2 is somehow “more stable” than p
E
1 , and viceversa for small values
of ε. More precisely, the basin of attraction of pE2 becomes bigger than the basin of p
E
1
(that is, the all-cooperators equilibrium becomes “more stable” than the no-cooperators
one), when it is m > 3x+ 1. A phase diagram of the SHC is given in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Phase diagram of the equilibria of the system described by Eq. (5).
For ε > 0 the continuous lines at pE = 0 and pE = 1 represent the (pure) stable
Nash equilibria, the dotted line represents the (mixed) unstable Nash equilibrium
pE = ω = 2x/(2x + ε). For m → (x + 1)+, i.e. ε → 0+ the unstable equilibrium
collapses on pE = 1, while for m → +∞, i.e. ε → +∞ it collapses on pE = 0: in
this limit only the all-cooperators configuration is stable. For ε < 0 pE1 remains stable,
whilst pE2 is unstable: there is actually a bifurcation in (p
E , ε) = (1, 0).
Despite its roughness, this simple model allows us to draw some preliminary
conclusions. In particular, it seems to be clear that cooperation is an advantageous
strategy only when the size of the clusters is much bigger than their averaged distance.
In the next section we will improve our investigation by means of the dynamical
homogeneous model.
4. Dynamical Homogeneous Model
The main feature of the SHM is that the system is frozen, i.e. does not evolve in time:
we set it in a given configuration (a great number of equal clusters of the same size and
at the same distance from each other) and wonder which is the most rational strategy
agents should adopt in order to improve their own fitness, without making them “play
the game” for real. What we want to do now is to write down a model with the general
properties stated in section 2, which can also evolve dynamically in time. For this
purpose, we are now going to introduce the “dynamical homogeneous model” (DHM).
DHM is implemented as follows. At t = 0 we divide a system of N individuals
into clusters each one of size m0, so that we have initially N/m0 clusters of the same
size (we always set N as a multiple of m0). Every generic cluster i is identified by a
natural variable gi ∈ {1, 2, ...,
N
m0
}: then, the distance between two agents belonging to
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the clusters j and k respectively will be djk = |gj − gk| (notice that with such definition
the distance is a discrete variable too). Moreover, each agent has a default strategy
(cooperative or not cooperative), picked up randomly, so that the initial density of
cooperators is ̺0. The dynamics works in this way: at each elementary step two
different agents, i and j, are drawn. If they belong to the same cluster, nothing
happens. Otherwise, they “play the game” according to the payoff matrix (2) and their
actual strategy: if both players cooperate, their clusters merge (the smallest is absorbed
by the biggest one); if one player defects, the cooperator leaves its cluster and joins
the opponent’s one; if nobody cooperates nothing happens. After the game, a player
computes what it would have gained if it had adopted the other strategy (remaining
fixed the strategy of the opponent). If such virtual payoff is greater than the real one,
the player will change its strategy at the next interaction. For simplicity, in order to
have easier simulations, even though the payoff is always calculated by means of the
matrix (2), in case of two clusters merging (when a pair of cooperators from different
groups meet), the smallest group enters the biggest one: in practice, they spend fitness
as ”meeting in the middle”, but in fact, it is the small cluster to reach the big one in its
position. Time is measured in montecarlo steps, so that on average every agent interacts
once per time unit. We accomplished all our simulations with ̺0 = 1/2 and for several
values of m0 and N .
1 10 100
t
10-3
10-2
10-1
100 ρ(t)
m(t)/N
I II III
Figure 2. Plot of the behaviour of the cooperators density (tick line) and of the
averaged size of the survived clusters divided by N (dashed line) for a DHM system
withN = 3024,m0 = 4 and tmax = 500 time units. Data averaged after 25 simulations.
The three different dynamical regimes are clearly distinguishable.
In Figure 2 we report the typical behaviour of the DHM for a particular choice of
the parameters (N = 3024, m0 = 4). This figure well summarizes the phenomenology
of our model. We can clearly distinguish three different dynamical regimes: at early
times we have Regime I, that we also call “exponential decay regime” for reasons we
will soon explain, then we find a steady-state regime or Regime II, and finally we have
Regime III, in which the system rapidly reaches a frozen state: we are going to study
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them separately in the following subsections.
Before analysing in details the three dynamical regimes, it is convenient to write
down the equations ruling the evolution of the main quantities which characterize the
state of the system. Concerning the cooperators density, which will be here indicated
by ̺(t), starting from the payoff matrix Aˆ written in Eq. 2, it is easy to see that its
time evolution must be ruled by the equation
d̺
dt
=
〈
N −mi
N
[
−2βij̺
2 + (1− βij − αij)̺(1− ̺) + 2(1− αij)(1− ̺)
2
]〉
i,j
(8)
where i is an agent randomly extracted, j another agent randomly extracted not
belonging to the same cluster of i, mi the size of the cluster of i, βij the probability that
mj − dij/2 is smaller than one, αij the probability that the quantity mj −mi + 1− dij
is smaller than zero. Finally, the symbol 〈·〉i,j means of course the average over every
possible couple i, j (with i and j belonging to different clusters). Analogously, the time
evolution of the averaged size of the survived clusters, m(t), will be given by
dm
dt
=
〈
mi(N −mi)
N2
·mj̺
2
〉
i,j
(9)
4.1. Exponential decay regime
At the very early stages of the dynamics, we can assume that the payoff matrix of each
agent (when interacting with foreigners) has the form
Aˆ0 =
(
m0 −
dij
2
1− dij
1 0
)
(10)
with m0 ≃ mi ∀i and, as we have already stated, dij = |gi − gj|. In such case we
have βij = β ∀i and αij = 1 ∀i, j: in the limit N ≫ mi (we will treat the case of m0
equal to a finite fraction of N in subsection 4.4) equations (8) and (9) become
˙̺(t) = −β̺(̺+ 1) (11)
and
m˙(t) =
m2̺2
N
(12)
whose solutions are, respectively
̺(t) =
̺0e
−βt
1 + ̺0(1− e−βt)
≃ ̺0e
−βt (13)
and
m(t) =
4Nβm0
4Nβ −m0(1− e−2βt)
(14)
Now, said d = 〈dij〉i,j, in this regime it is β = Pr(m0−d/2 < 1), and this probability
depends in general on m0 and N . Anyway, it is straightforward to understand that
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β(m0 = 1) = 1 ∀N , and that limN→+∞ β(m0) = 1 ∀m0. On the basis of these
considerations, we expect an exponential decay of ̺(t) at early stages of dynamics,
with coefficient β equal to one for m0 = 1, and tending to one for increasing values of
the size N of the entire system if m0 > 1. This fact is fully confirmed by Figures 3 and
4.
0 2 4 6 8 10
t
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
ρ(t
)
Figure 3. Plot of the initial behaviour of the cooperators density as a function of
time form0 = 1, N = 10000 after 100 simulations. The empty circles are the numerical
data, the full line is the exponential fit ∼ exp(−βt), with β = 0.99± 0.01.
0 2 4 6 8 10
t
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
ρ(t
)
N=800
N=3024
N=10000
Figure 4. Plot of the initial behaviour of the cooperators density as a function of
time for m0 = 4, N = 800 (triangles), N = 3024 (squares) and N = 10000 (circles)
after 100 simulations. The full line is the exponential fit ∼ exp(−βt) for N = 10000,
with β = 0.97± 0.01.
Regarding the averaged size of survived clusters, we see from Eq. (14) that, while
it remains valid, m(t) is bigger than m0 and smaller than the quantity
m∞ =
(
1
m0
−
1
4Nβ
)
−1
≃ m0
(
1 +
m0
4Nβ
)
≃ m0
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so that m(t) is practically constant during this regime: a proof of the last statement
is given already in Figure 2, where it is clear how m(t) is a quasi-constant in the initial
stages of the dynamics. More precisely, it is a quasi-constant apart a small initial
increasing due to the interactions among cooperators during the very early times of the
dynamics, and indeed such increase vanishes in the limit ρ0 → 0
+ (see Figure 5). It
must be noticed that, because for every survived cluster k it must be mk > 0, and
we are dealing with small values of m0, this means that the clusters distribution inside
the system remains rather close to the initial one (see also Figure 7). Moreover, we
emphasize the fact that the quantity m∞ is just a limit superior of m(t) during the
exponential decay regime, and not a value that the averaged size can effectively reach.
0 5 10
t
0.00066
0.00073
0.00079
0.00086
<
m
(t)
>/N
ρ0=0.5
ρ0=0.25
ρ0=0.125
Figure 5. Initial increasing (up to tmax = 10) of averaged clusters size (divided by
N), for a system with N = 3024, m0 = 2 and ρ0 = 0.5 (full line), ρ0 = 0.25 (dashed
line), ρ0 = 0.125 (dotted line); data averaged over 25 different simulations. The small
increasing step (m(tmax)/m0 ∼ 1.3 for ρ0 = 0.5) takes place at the very early stages
(until tmax ≃ 3), and rapidly decreases with ρ(0) decreasing.
The exponential decay regime will last until the cooperators density is not too
small: we expect actually that it should end when ̺ becomes of the order of N−1. From
Eq. (13) we gain
̺0e
−βt∗ ≈
1
N
=⇒ t∗ ≈
1
β
log(̺0N) (15)
For the case depicted in Figure 3 (β = 1, ̺0 = 0.5, N = 10000), previous relation
gives t∗ ≈ 8.5, in good agreement with the numerical data. For values of m0 greater
than 1, the evaluation of t∗ directly from Eq. (15) is more delicate because in this case
also the quantity β depends in its turn on N , and moreover there are bigger fluctuations
in the system (when two cooperators meet their groups merge, and this causes bigger
fluctuations in clusters distribution as m increases); however the relation t∗ ∝ log(N)
is valid ∀m0, as we will see in subsection 4.2. Therefore, for N → +∞ this regime
never ends: ̺(t) → 0 and, from Eq. (14), we find m(t) ≃ m0 = const. Then, in the
thermodynamical limit (when m0 ≪ N for every finite m0) we have a similar result
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of the SHM, where the unique (stable) Nash equilibrium is the complete absence of
cooperators. On the other hand, this is coherent with the fact that, if we set the system
ab initio with ̺0 = 0, nothing will ever happen.
4.2. Steady state
Once, for finite values of N , the cooperators density became very small and the system
left the Regime I, the equation (11) is not valid any more. Indeed, in this case almost
every interaction will be between two defectors, so that equation (8) becomes
˙̺(t) ≃ −2(1− α)(1− ̺)2 (16)
where we took into accounts that from Eq. (14) the clusters distribution is
practically the initial one, and then we assumed again N ≫ mi and αij = α ∀i, j.
But, as we have just said, the clusters density is still almost equal to the initial one, so
that it must be also α = Pr(1− d < 0) ≃ 1, from which
˙̺(t) ≃ 0 =⇒ ̺(t) ≃ ̺ss = const. (17)
In Figure 6 we can see this behaviour for the case N = 3024 and m0 = 2; in Figure
7 we show instead how the majority of the agents remains in the initial cluster also
during this second dynamical regime.
0 50 100 150 200
t
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
ρ(t)
m(t)/N
Figure 6. Plot of the cooperators density and of the normalized size of survived
clusters for N = 3024 and m0 = 2 after 100 simulations. After the initial decay, there
is a clear steady state regime in which both ̺(t) and m(t)/N remain almost constant.
As we can easily see, ̺(t) is actually almost constant, just slightly increasing because
of small fluctuations in the clusters distribution which make α not perfectly equal to
one, but a very little bit smaller. On the other hand, m(t) keeps on behaving as in the
exponential decay regime. This can be seen by inserting Eq. (17) into (12), obtaining
m˙(t) =
̺2ss
N
m2(t) =⇒ m(t) ≃
m0N
N −m0̺2sst
(18)
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0 5 10 15 20
t
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
ρ(t)
m(t)/N
0 5 10 15 20
t
0,5
0,75
1
conservative sites density
Figure 7. Upper graph: cooperators density and averaged clusters size (divided by
N) for a DHM system with N = 10000 and m0 = 1 until tmax = 20 time units (data
averaged after 100 different simulations). Lower graph: density of “conservative sites”,
that is the sites which are still in the initial cluster, for the same system of the upper
graph. As one can see, after an initial drop, the majority of agents (about the 60%) is
still in its original group also during the steady state regime.
where we exploited again the fact that m(t) does not change too much during the
Regime I. Now, while the quantity m0̺
2
sst remains much smaller than N , also m(t)
remains close to m0 (see Figures 2 and 6). However, once the relation m0̺
2
sst ≪ N
ceases to be true, the system exits from the steady state regime, because at this point
m(t)≫ m0 and the clusters distribution is now quite different from the initial one: so,
also the quantities αij in Eq. (8) become considerably smaller than 1 and this changes
dramatically the shape of ̺(t) too, as shown in Figure 2.
Before starting the analysis of the subsequent regime, it is worth to take a look to
the behaviour of ̺ss as a function of N and m0. For m0 = 1, from Eq. (15) it has to be
necessarily
̺0e
−βt∗ ≡ ̺ss ∼
1
N
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The same behaviour is found for higher m0, as one can see in Figure 8, so that we
can conclude stating the relation
̺ss(N ;m0) ∼ N
−1 ∀m0 (19)
Of course, last equation, together with (15), demonstrates also that the time t∗ for
leaving the Regime I is proportional to log(N) for every value of m0.
1000 10000
N
10-3
10-2
10-1
ρ s
s
m0=4
m0=3
Figure 8. Plot of the behaviour of ̺ss as a function of the system’s size N for
m0 = 3 (diamonds) and m0 = 4 (circles). The full lines are power-law fits ∼ N
−γ ,
with γ = 1.02± 0.02 (m0 = 4) and γ = 1.05± 0.01 (m0 = 3).
4.3. Frozen state
It is straightforward to understand that the steady state cannot last forever. Indeed,
according to Eq. (18), the survived clusters averaged size should diverge after a time t¯
given by
t¯ =
N
m0̺2ss
∼ N3
Anyway, it is obviously impossible that m → +∞, since of course m(t) ≤ N . In
fact, the dynamics freezes well before this time t¯: in Figure 9 we report the behaviour
of the freezing time for a couple of values of m0, from which it is possible to see that the
freezing time tF follows actually a power-law on N , but with exponent δ ≈ 0.8 instead
of 3.
Here we wonder what kind of frozen state is finally reached by the system. Let us
consider the general equation (9) ruling over the evolution of m(t). Assuming the sizes
of survived clusters as independent from each other at every time, so that we can write
〈mimj〉 = 〈mi〉〈mj〉 = m
2 ∀t, we obtain
dm
dt
=
m2(N −m)
N2
̺2(t) (20)
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256 512 1024 2048 4096
N
16
32
64
128
tF
m0=5
m0=4
Figure 9. Plot of the behaviour of tF as a function of N for m0 = 4 (stars) and
m0 = 5 (circles); the dashed lines are power-law fits with exponent δ = 0.83±0.02 and
δ = 0.81± 0.02, respectively.
By integrating last relation, we find now
m(t)e−[N/m(t)]
N −m(t)
= K · exp
[∫ t
0
̺2(τ)dτ
]
(21)
being K a suitable (positive) constant. Now, in the limit t → +∞, there is an
instant tF (the freezing time we introduced above) such that ̺(t) = ̺(tF ) ∀t ≥ tF , and
said ̺F this cooperators density of the frozen state, from equation (21) it is clear that
there are only two possible final configurations:
• (A) - If we have ̺F = 0 (no cooperators in the final state), then it must necessarily
be mF < N , that is the frozen state is disordered.
• (B) - If instead we have ̺F > 0 (finite fraction of cooperators in the final state),
then the integral at right side diverges, so that it must be mF = N , thus the frozen
state is ordered (i.e. only one survived cluster remains in the system).
The configuration (A) is completely lacking in cooperators, so, in order to be frozen,
the difference in size between two clusters whatever must be always less than their
distance minus 1: in the opposite case, as one can see from the payoff matrix (2), there
would be players who could become cooperators after an interaction. On the other
hand, the configuration (B) is pretty easy to understand, since when the entire system
is occupied by just one cluster, dynamics stops by definition. Now, in the steady state
regime, the cooperators density is so small that it is possible to get a fluctuation pushing
the system in the disordered frozen state, with no cooperators and many clusters in it.
If instead such a fluctuation does not happen, the normal dynamics given by equations
(8) and (9), or even more simply by (21), will drive the system into the ordered frozen
state, with a finite density of cooperators, and one mega-cluster occupying the whole
system. For these reasons we expect that the probability of the system to end in the
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disordered frozen configuration increases with ̺ss decreasing, i.e. with N increasing and
m0 decreasing. Actually, for m0 = 1 and after 1000 simulations, we observed the system
ending in the ordered state only three times for N = 100, just once for N = 200, and
never for higher N . On the other hand for m0 ≥ 4, we did not ever observe the system
falling in the disordered configuration, since in this case ̺ss becomes small enough only
at very high N , when the freezing time is too big to be observed. Finally, the ratio
between the number of times in which the frozen state is ordered over the number in
which it is ordered drops from 0.86 for N = 200 to 0.1 for N = 2000 in the case m0 = 2,
and it is still 0.95 for N = 3024 when m0 = 3.
An interesting aspect of the ordered configuration is that the density of cooperators
is in this case finite but less than one: so, even though the disordered frozen state is
just the Nash equilibrium pE1 = 0 of the SHM (see section 3), the ordered one is not the
perfect counterpart of the analogous in SHM. That can be explained because when the
system is very close to the completely ordered state, the agents belonging to the biggest
cluster have no interest in cooperation, so that most of them will be defectors. This is
shown in Figures 2 and 10 where it is easy to see how the abundance of cooperators
in the frozen ordered state is always well smaller than 1/2 (remaining around 1/3).
On the other hand, this is not a real Nash equilibrium, since it does not exist in the
thermodynamical limit.
1 10 100 1000
t
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
ρ(t
)
m0=3, N=1200
m0=5, N=1200
m0=5, N=3025
Figure 10. Plot of ̺(t) as a function of time for some values of m0 and N , after 100
simulations. Every simulation ended in the completely ordered frozen state; indeed
the (not shown) shape of m(t) for the values of parameters here reported is the same
of Figure 2, i.e. it is always mF /N = 1.
4.4. Limit of very large initial clusters
Until now we have dealt with small values of the initial clusters size m0: more precisely,
so far we have exploited the thermodynamical limit supposing fixed m0 as N increases.
Now, one could wonder what happens to the system if we set instead m0 = zN (with
0 < z < 1) before doing the limit N → +∞. Indeed, in the SHM, a transition
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between the phase with the unique stable Nash equilibrium pE1 and the phase with two
stable equilibria (in particular the new one pE2 ) takes place for m = x+ 1, being x the
half averaged distance among all clusters. An analogous transition in DHM somehow
happens, but in a rather trivial way: indeed, when m0 diverges (even remaining much
smaller than N), a single interaction between two cooperators will create a new cluster
very much bigger than the others, thus the system will reach the ordered state soon,
typically after much less than 10 time units.
5. Conclusions and Perspectives
In this paper we have depicted some new ideas for the study and the understanding
of the phenomena of social aggregation in human communities. First, we suggested a
theoretical treatment based on both statistical mechanics and game theory. Secondly,
a fundamental feature of our approach is the interplay between the inclination of every
agent to cooperate with others (in order to live in groups as big as possible), and an
opposite attitude not to move away from the actual group since joining a new one
involves a work accomplished by the agent itself. This work, needed by an individual
when it associates to a stranger cluster, is interpreted as a “distance” in the abstract
space of cultural coordinates: the more two groups have different CC, the more they are
far away from each other in this space, the more is the work an individual must spend
to go from one cluster to the other. In order to test the reliability of this approach, we
conceived a couple of very simple toy models, both constructed with the general features
described above, the first one being a pure evolutionary population model, the second
one an agent model with a well defined dynamics at a microscopical level.
The results obtained with such toy models suggest that cooperation is the most
suitable strategy only in presence of very big clusters, so that the gain in fitness of the
individuals who join these big groups is greater than the distance they had to cover to
reach their new “accommodation”. More precisely, using the language of game theory,
we found that cooperation is an evolutionary stable Nash equilibrium, when the averaged
size of clusters is bigger enough with respect to the averaged distance among them.
These models are of course a tough simplification of the real world, and contain
some unsatisfactory features: in particular, the property of the clusters to merge when
two cooperators of them meet is quite strong, and also the definition of distance
between clusters appears to be somehow arbitrary. Improving the models in these
aspects can be the goal of future researches. Anyway, despite such problems, our
results are qualitatively realistic for some important social phenomena which involve
human societies. Indeed, our results suggest that in an area occupied by a great
deal of small communities, distributed more or less uniformly, nobody has interest to
move from home to another community, since there is no real difference among the
communities, and a displacement would mean only a work to accomplish without any
gain in fitness. However, when some of these communities, because of a change in the
external conditions, or for a simple fluctuation, become quite big with respect to the
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other ones, they assume the role of centres of attraction, destinations of the immigration
of people from anywhere, so that these centres reach soon the typical size of a metropolis.
This aggregation mechanism seems actually to be what really happened during several
urbanization phenomena through history, as for instance the “urban explosion” in the
basin of the Mediterranean Sea around the XII Century BC, or also in Western Europe
during the Industrial Revolution. It is worth to notice that in this picture the merging
of two groups when only two cooperators interact is not so unrealistic, since presumably
an immigrant will call and invite to the big city his former fellow citizens. Moreover, in
many cases this same dynamics is apparently at work when religions, political parties,
idioms or other kinds of social aggregations grow up inside a society. Finally, it is worth
also to mention the result that, as we saw in subsection 4.3, it is not really necessary
that every individual has to cooperate in order to merge different clusters into one: on
the contrary, the fraction of cooperators can be less than 0.5 also in systems made up
of only one big cultural cluster.
Of course, deeper studies and further interpretations are needed, but the fact that
so oversimplified models give already reasonable results is very encouraging and suggest
to continue with this kind of study.
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APPENDIX
In order to determine the stability of the Nash equilibria shown by Eq. (7) it is enough
to integrate the replicator equation given in (5), obtaining
p1−ω(1− p)ω
|p− ω|
= G · exp [2x(ω − 1)t] (.1)
being G a positive integration constant. Now, solving explicitly in p the relation
(.1) is in general impossible, but if we define the quantity Lω ∈ R as
Lω
.
= lim
t→+∞
exp [2x(ω − 1)t] (.2)
it is easy to see that for −2x < ε < 0, that is ω > 1, we have Lω = +∞ and this
implies necessarily p→ 0+ (the exponent 1−ω is naturally negative); on the other hand,
for ε < −2x, that is ω < 0, it is Lω = 0, implying again necessarily p → 0
+ (now the
exponent 1−ω is positive). So, it is proven that only pE1 is stable for ε < 0. Finally, for
ε > 0, that is 0 < ω < 1, it results Lω = 0, with both exponents ω and 1 − ω positive,
implying that p can tend to 0+ or 1−, but not to pE3 = ω, which is therefore unstable.
Regarding the evaluation of the size of the basins of attraction in the case ε > 0,
we could effectively compute the smallest fluctuation needed to escape from each of
them. Anyway, it is for sure easier, watching Figure 1, if we consider that the unstable
equilibrium pE3 is the separator between the two basins, so that the basin of stability of
pE1 is of course of size ω = 2x/(2x+ε), while the basin of p
E
2 has size 1−ω = ε/(2x+ε).
Besides, such basins will be equal for ε∗ = 2x, i.e. for m∗ = 3x+ 1.
